The Biggest Winners And Losers In The Private Resale Market of Q2 2026

A condo in Ang Mo Kio posted a +37.9% PSF gain last quarter. That number is based on three sales.

One high-floor unit in a quiet quarter can move the quarterly average by exactly that magnitude. The Meadows @ Peirce result is not wrong — it is just not a market signal. Three transactions tell you almost nothing about where prices are heading. They tell you which units happened to sell in a slow quarter.

This problem runs through almost every dramatic number on the standard quarterly PSF gainers and losers list. And once you filter it out, the data that remains is far more interesting — and, for some condo owners, considerably more uncomfortable.

Of the 10 biggest PSF movers this quarter, 9 rest on fewer than 8 transactions. One high-floor sale in a quiet quarter can shift the average by 30%. The meaningful signals are buried in the projects with 100+ quarterly transactions.

The Gainers List Is Almost Entirely Noise

Here is what the headline gainers list actually looks like when you add transaction counts:

Meadows @ Peirce has a genuinely strong long-run record — 100% win rate across 24 transactions, average profit of $765k. But the +37.9% quarterly jump on 3 sales is not momentum. The project's PSF range across all 24 transactions spans $1,084 to $1,773 per sqft. One premium unit in a quiet quarter can swing the quarterly average across that entire range without telling you anything real about the market.

Altez is the clearest anomaly on this list. It appears as a +29.0% gainer on 5 transactions. But the project's full 2-year record — 12 transactions — shows a 50% win rate and an average outcome of essentially breakeven (average loss of $35k). This is a CCR Downtown Core project in District 2, completed in 2014. The quarterly number is compositional noise. The 2-year record is the honest reading.

The losers list has the same problem. Skies Miltonia dropped -20.2% on 4 transactions. Sky Habitat fell -17.8% on 3. Both are almost certainly mix shifts — smaller or lower-floor units happening to sell in a thin quarter. Sky Habitat's actual 2-year record across 42 transactions shows an 88% win rate and average profit of $445k. That number did not suddenly evaporate last quarter.

Only one project on the entire losers list has enough quarterly volume to take seriously: Mandarin Gardens, which fell -11.1% on 11 transactions. And that decline has a structural explanation — the project launched its 99-year lease in the mid-1980s, leaving roughly 59–60 years remaining. That sits right at the threshold where CPF usage restrictions and bank financing constraints begin to create genuine buyer friction. The quarterly dip may be the start of a lease-decay headwind, not just compositional noise.

Strip Out the Noise — Here Is What the Data Actually Shows

Apply a minimum of 100 quarterly transactions and the gainers-and-losers picture becomes both cleaner and more credible:

The two clearest gainers in the entire resale dataset are Treasure At Tampines (OCR Tampines, completed 2023, 341 transactions, 99.7% 2-year win rate, average profit $346k) and Jadescape (RCR Bishan, completed 2022, 176 transactions, 100% win rate, average profit $543k). These are not dramatic headline numbers — +3.1% and +3.7% — but they are real, backed by hundreds of actual sales, and consistent with strong underlying records.

Kingsford Waterbay is the most structurally interesting decliner. The -4.1% drop on 143 transactions is real signal. The explanation is not mysterious: the project sits at Upper Serangoon View in Hougang, and the nearest transit is Kangkar LRT, roughly a 22-minute walk away. There are no malls or hawker centres within 500 metres. Despite that constraint, sellers are still broadly ahead — 94% win rate across 143 transactions, average profit $161k — but the PSF is clearly softening at the margin, and the transit gap is the most likely structural reason.

Reflections At Keppel Bay is worth a correction here. It is sometimes grouped with CCR projects, but it is classified RCR — District 4, Bukit Merah planning area. The project is about a 9–10 minute walk from Telok Blangah MRT, with HarbourFront Centre roughly 440 metres away. The location is not the problem. The problem is in the long-run numbers: across 118 transactions, the 2-year win rate is only 51%, and the average outcome is a loss of $84k. The quarterly dip of -4.8% is not a temporary blip inside a healthy project — it is consistent with a long-run performance picture that has essentially gone nowhere for sellers.

The Topiary's -5.0% on 111 transactions looks alarming until you check the underlying record: 99% win rate, average profit $653k across 2 years. The quarterly dip is real but does not signal distress. Sellers at this OCR Sengkang project (completed 2016) are broadly well ahead.

The Rule That Breaks Down for One Group of Sellers

Here is the foundational assumption most condo owners carry: if you hold long enough, time rescues the trade.

The overall transaction data, across 25,271 resale records, largely supports this.

Hold for more than 10 years and the typical outcome is a $716k profit with a 95% win rate. The data says patience works.

But there is a cluster of CCR projects where this table is simply wrong. And the sellers in that cluster did not panic-sell, did not get unlucky with a single bad year, and did not give up too early. Many of them held for 12, 14, even 18 years. They lost anyway.

OUE Twin Peaks: 43 sellers, average hold of 7.9 years, 93% lost money. Marina Bay Suites: 20 sellers, average hold of 13.6 years, 90% lost money. The URA non-landed private residential price index rose from 197.5 in Q3 2024 to 210.8 in Q1 2026. The market was not falling. These sellers simply bought at prices the resale market never recovered to.

Where Patience Stopped Working

The projects that broke the long-hold rule share a common thread. They were completed between 2011 and 2017, in many cases launched during or near the 2007–2008 pre-GFC CCR pricing peak. The resale market has not returned to those levels for units of this type and size.

OUE Twin Peaks (River Valley, CCR District 9, 99-year, completed 2015): 43 transactions. 3 sellers made money. 40 did not. Average hold was 7.9 years. Average loss: $332k. Typical unit around 1,055 sqft at $2,241 PSF currently.

Marina Bay Suites (Downtown Core, CCR District 1, 99-year, completed 2013): 20 transactions, the most statistically reliable reading in the CCR loss group after OUE Twin Peaks and Marina One. 2 sellers made money. 18 did not. Average hold 13.6 years. Average loss: $649k. Typical unit around 1,625 sqft at $1,931 PSF.

Marina One Residences (Downtown Core, CCR District 1, 99-year, completed 2017): 56 transactions — the largest single sample in the CCR loss cluster and therefore the most credible. 2 sellers made money. 54 did not. Average hold around 7 years. Average loss: $293k. Typical unit around 1,044 sqft at $2,006 PSF.

Cliveden At Grange (River Valley, CCR District 10, freehold, completed 2011): 8 transactions. Win rate: 0%. Average loss: $1.92M. Average hold: roughly 14 years. The worst single transaction: a $3.71M loss on a 17-year hold. Being freehold did not protect buyers here.

Helios Residences (Newton, CCR District 9, freehold, completed around 2011): 10 transactions. Win rate: 0%. Average loss: $1.17M. Average hold: roughly 12.5 years. Again, freehold tenure offered no protection.

Marina Collection (Sentosa Cove, CCR District 4, 99-year, completed 2011): 7 transactions. Win rate: 0%. Average loss: $2.43M — the highest average loss of any project in this dataset. Typical unit around 3,272 sqft. The worst individual transaction: a $3.675M loss on an 18-year hold. HarbourFront MRT is roughly 3km away with no practical walking route. Sentosa Cove's geographic isolation — no MRT access, no nearby hawker centres or job nodes — has structurally constrained buyer demand since the project completed. This is not simply a CCR vintage problem; it is a location structure problem layered on top of it.

This article is treating Marina Collection and Seascape separately from the mainland CCR projects for exactly that reason. The Sentosa Cove geography (car-dependent, ~3km from HarbourFront MRT) makes those losses partly a location story, not purely an entry-price story. The mainland CCR losses — OUE Twin Peaks, Marina Bay Suites, Marina One Residences, Cliveden At Grange, Helios — are harder to explain away on location grounds. These projects are in River Valley, Newton, and Downtown Core, where underlying demand exists. The entry price is the variable that is left standing.

The Same Tier Produced Both Extremes

CCR is not a uniformly bad place to have bought. It also hosts the strongest long-run returns in the entire dataset.

Ardmore Park (Newton, CCR District 10, freehold, completed 2001): 12 transactions, 100% win rate, average profit $4.84M. Typical unit around 2,885 sqft. Average hold roughly 15.7 years.

Grange Residences (CCR District 10): 10 transactions, average profit $4.25M. Typical unit around 2,852 sqft.

Leedon Residence (Bukit Timah, CCR District 10, freehold, completed 2015): 28 transactions, 96% win rate, average profit $1.7M. Typical unit around 2,131 sqft.

The pattern that separates these from the loss cluster is not luck. CCR winners are almost all freehold, completed before 2005 or launched at less aggressive pricing, and their typical unit sizes are substantially larger — 2,000 to 3,200 sqft versus the 850–1,625 sqft range that dominates the loss cluster. Larger, more distinctive units in established CCR addresses appear to have held intrinsic value in a way that the smaller, more commoditised units in the 2010–2017 CCR launches did not.

This is a meaningful competing explanation. Some of the CCR losses may be a small-unit story as much as a vintage story — buyers who purchased differentiated, large-format units in Ardmore Park or Leedon fared very differently from buyers who purchased 1,044-sqft apartments at Marina One Residences, even within the same broad CCR designation.

What the Data Can and Cannot Settle

Three honest caveats belong here.

First: the unit-size difference between CCR winners and losers is real, but it does not fully resolve the question. Leedon Residence (28 transactions, 96% win rate) completed in 2015 — the same era as OUE Twin Peaks — and still produced strong returns. Unit size explains some of the divergence. Entry price relative to intrinsic value explains more.

Second: the Sentosa Cove losses are partly a structural geography problem that most CCR owners do not share. Marina Collection and Seascape belong in their own category. The mainland CCR losses are the more universal signal.

Third: the data captures sellers who exited in 2024–2026. It cannot tell us whether sellers who hold another 5–10 years at OUE Twin Peaks or Marina One Residences will eventually recover. The CCR segment has underperformed OCR and RCR since 2013, partly through successive policy interventions (SSD, TDSR, multiple ABSD rounds). It is genuinely possible that some of these projects are mid-cycle rather than permanently impaired. The data supports the entry-price explanation strongly. It does not rule out the incomplete-recovery-cycle explanation.

What the Investigation Shows

The quarterly PSF momentum list is almost entirely noise unless the project has at least 100 transactions behind it. Strip that filter in and the picture is simple: Treasure At Tampines and Jadescape are genuinely gaining. Kingsford Waterbay, Reflections At Keppel Bay, and The Topiary are genuinely softening — two of them for reasons that go beyond the quarter.

But the more unsettling finding is in the long-hold data. The 10+ year hold table says patience produces a $716k average profit and a 95% win rate. What it does not say is that this average is built across the whole market, including OCR and RCR projects where entry pricing was set at more sustainable levels.

For a specific cohort of CCR buyers — those who bought 850–1,625 sqft apartments at 2007–2017 pricing in projects like Marina One Residences, OUE Twin Peaks, and Marina Bay Suites — patience changed very little. The entry price was set where the resale market eventually chose not to follow. And the URA index rising from 197.5 to 210.8 over the past seven quarters did not change that for the sellers who exited during that window.

The quarterly list shows you movement. The hold-period data shows you whether movement eventually rescues the trade. For one specific cohort, in one specific market segment, the answer over 7–15 years has been no.