Every district in Singapore ranked from First to Last (By Avg Return %)
Within the real estate agent community, there is a common saying that CCR properties cannot buy and that OCR properties are the way to go for most Singaporeans and the truth is that you don't need to commission a research or be a rocket scientist to know that that statement has truth to it.
At the end of the day, OCR encompasses many neighbourhoods and exactly which OCR neighbourhood takes the crown and by how much?
Here's what I found:
Every District, Ranked
| Rank | District | Main Area(s) | Region | Txns | Projects | Avg Profit | Avg Return | Win Rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | D26 | Ang Mo Kio / Yishun | OCR | 143 | 10 | $704,454 | 74.5% | 100.0% |
| 2 | D22 | Jurong West / Jurong East | OCR | 718 | 19 | $557,204 | 69.2% | 99.9% |
| 3 | D21 | Bukit Timah / Bukit Panjang / Bukit Batok | RCR / OCR | 755 | 46 | $705,718 | 63.5% | 99.6% |
| 4 | D23 | Choa Chu Kang / Bukit Batok / Bukit Panjang | OCR / RCR | 1,677 | 52 | $497,274 | 61.3% | 99.6% |
| 5 | D20 | Bishan / Ang Mo Kio / Toa Payoh | RCR / OCR | 840 | 30 | $661,531 | 60.3% | 99.9% |
| 6 | D25 | Woodlands | OCR | 598 | 14 | $428,644 | 56.8% | 99.8% |
| 7 | D19 | Hougang / Sengkang / Punggol | OCR / RCR | 3,781 | 124 | $531,568 | 56.0% | 99.3% |
| 8 | D15 | Bedok / Marine Parade / Kallang | RCR / OCR | 1,558 | 168 | $700,211 | 55.3% | 98.3% |
| 9 | D27 | Yishun / Sembawang / Mandai | OCR | 1,289 | 31 | $473,472 | 54.9% | 99.5% |
| 10 | D16 | Bedok / Tampines | OCR | 1,209 | 55 | $526,951 | 52.1% | 98.0% |
| 11 | D18 | Tampines / Pasir Ris | OCR | 2,237 | 40 | $463,046 | 49.7% | 99.9% |
| 12 | D11 | Novena / Bukit Timah / Toa Payoh | CCR | 559 | 73 | $737,977 | 47.6% | 93.7% |
| 13 | D28 | Sengkang / Serangoon / Ang Mo Kio | OCR | 737 | 17 | $448,196 | 44.3% | 99.1% |
| 14 | D5 | Clementi / Queenstown | OCR / RCR | 1,247 | 56 | $483,798 | 42.2% | 98.5% |
| 15 | D17 | Pasir Ris | OCR | 531 | 21 | $354,070 | 40.7% | 98.9% |
| 16 | D12 | Kallang / Novena / Toa Payoh | RCR | 590 | 58 | $424,623 | 39.4% | 98.1% |
| 17 | D14 | Geylang / Bedok / Kallang | RCR / OCR | 1,112 | 86 | $403,518 | 38.5% | 98.2% |
| 18 | D8 | Kallang / Rochor | RCR | 271 | 32 | $385,508 | 37.8% | 95.2% |
| 19 | D10 | Tanglin / Bukit Timah / Orchard | CCR | 1,333 | 149 | $752,631 | 36.8% | 93.6% |
| 20 | D13 | Toa Payoh / Serangoon / Geylang | RCR / OCR | 572 | 24 | $401,950 | 32.6% | 98.4% |
| 21 | D3 | Bukit Merah / Queenstown / Singapore River | RCR | 1,105 | 28 | $418,787 | 32.1% | 96.9% |
| 22 | D9 | River Valley / Newton / Rochor | CCR | 1,098 | 106 | $467,047 | 26.5% | 81.3% |
| 23 | D7 | Downtown Core / Kallang / Rochor | CCR / RCR | 198 | 11 | $225,048 | 22.7% | 87.9% |
| 24 | D4 | Bukit Merah / Southern Islands | RCR / CCR | 516 | 20 | $201,456 | 18.9% | 76.6% |
| 25 | D2 | Downtown Core / Bukit Merah / Outram | CCR / RCR | 271 | 16 | $140,437 | 16.2% | 80.8% |
| 26 | D1 | Downtown Core / Singapore River / Outram | CCR / RCR | 321 | 10 | -$44,299 | 5.4% | 46.1% |
| 27 | D6 | Downtown Core | CCR | 5 | 1 | $379,600 | 5.1% | 100.0% |
Here are the projects with the absolute best returns looked like (without filtering for recency)
| Rank | Project | District | Area | Region | Txns | Avg Size | Avg Purchase Price | Avg Selling Price | Avg Profit | Avg Return | Avg Holding Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | The Windsor | D20 | Bishan | RCR | 15 | 1,793 sqft | $1,111,067 | $2,849,993 | $1,738,926 | 181.3% | 20.6 yrs |
| 2 | Botanic Gardens View | D10 | Tanglin | CCR | 11 | 1,453 sqft | $1,606,845 | $3,462,436 | $1,855,591 | 180.4% | 16.6 yrs |
| 3 | Bishan Loft | D20 | Bishan | RCR | 17 | 1,399 sqft | $1,071,121 | $2,316,852 | $1,245,730 | 172.2% | 16.0 yrs |
| 4 | The Dew | D23 | Bukit Batok | OCR | 5 | 1,318 sqft | $629,000 | $1,526,320 | $897,320 | 164.0% | 19.7 yrs |
| 5 | Ocean Park | D15 | Bedok | OCR | 11 | 2,224 sqft | $2,189,364 | $4,235,727 | $2,046,364 | 159.4% | 16.9 yrs |
| 6 | Cashew Heights Condominium | D23 | Bukit Panjang | OCR | 9 | 1,562 sqft | $1,162,333 | $2,467,764 | $1,305,431 | 152.3% | 14.5 yrs |
| 7 | Goldenhill Park Condominium | D20 | Serangoon | OCR | 11 | 1,351 sqft | $1,410,491 | $3,065,818 | $1,655,327 | 150.3% | 17.6 yrs |
| 8 | Parkshore | D15 | Kallang | RCR | 8 | 1,644 sqft | $1,621,875 | $3,398,750 | $1,776,875 | 143.1% | 17.4 yrs |
| 9 | The Dairy Farm | D23 | Bukit Panjang | OCR | 14 | 1,728 sqft | $1,386,786 | $2,799,063 | $1,412,278 | 143.1% | 16.9 yrs |
| 10 | Parc Palais | D21 | Bukit Batok | OCR | 21 | 1,531 sqft | $1,120,662 | $2,504,614 | $1,383,952 | 141.8% | 20.3 yrs |
This table is useful, but it should not be read as a simple “buy these projects” list because the top performers here are mostly long-hold winners. Many were bought 15 to 20 years ago, at purchase prices that are no longer available in 2026.
That matters because the lesson is not simply that these projects are magic. The lesson is that strong resale outcomes often came from a combination of large unit sizes, lower historical entry prices, and long holding periods.
In other words, this table tells us what worked for past buyers. It does not automatically tell us what to look out for today.
To make that visible, the table includes average purchase price, average selling price, average profit, average return, and average holding period. The holding period is especially important: if a project produced a 150% return over 17 years, that is very different from producing the same return over five years.
After filtering for recency
| Rank | Project | TOP | District | Area | Region | Txns | Avg Size | Avg Purchase | Avg Sale | Avg Profit | Avg Return | Avg Holding Period | Win Rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Parc Esta | 2022 | D14 | Geylang | RCR | 236 | 765 sqft | $1,297,436 | $1,761,606 | $464,170 | 33.6% | 5.5 yrs | 100.0% |
| 2 | Parc Clematis | 2023 | D5 | Clementi | OCR | 101 | 851 sqft | $1,423,871 | $1,892,577 | $468,706 | 32.1% | 5.0 yrs | 99.0% |
| 3 | Jadescape | 2022 | D20 | Bishan | RCR | 176 | 913 sqft | $1,559,026 | $2,101,948 | $542,922 | 31.4% | 5.2 yrs | 100.0% |
| 4 | Whistler Grand | 2022 | D5 | Clementi | OCR | 119 | 752 sqft | $1,093,904 | $1,442,140 | $348,236 | 29.5% | 5.4 yrs | 100.0% |
| 5 | Riverfront Residences | 2023 | D19 | Hougang | OCR | 163 | 794 sqft | $1,050,668 | $1,378,491 | $327,823 | 29.0% | 5.9 yrs | 100.0% |
| 6 | Twin Vew | 2021 | D5 | Clementi | OCR | 56 | 917 sqft | $1,315,786 | $1,710,841 | $395,055 | 28.9% | 6.1 yrs | 100.0% |
| 7 | Seaside Residences | 2021 | D15 | Bedok | OCR | 77 | 773 sqft | $1,396,495 | $1,816,998 | $420,503 | 28.4% | 6.9 yrs | 98.7% |
| 8 | Stirling Residences | 2022 | D3 | Queenstown | RCR | 211 | 702 sqft | $1,304,887 | $1,681,669 | $376,782 | 27.6% | 5.7 yrs | 99.5% |
| 9 | Treasure At Tampines | 2023 | D18 | Tampines | OCR | 341 | 890 sqft | $1,220,975 | $1,566,628 | $345,653 | 27.2% | 4.7 yrs | 99.7% |
| 10 | Park Colonial | 2021 | D13 | Toa Payoh | RCR | 108 | 768 sqft | $1,376,823 | $1,771,772 | $394,949 | 26.4% | 5.9 yrs | 100.0% |
The point of this table is not that every recent launch made money equally. It is that the better-performing recent-cycle projects cleared a surprisingly high bar within a relatively short holding period. Most of them were held for about five to six years, not 15 to 20 years, and still produced average profits in the mid-six figures.
By contrast, the bottom three districts in the overall ranking averaged just $139,597 in project-level profit and a 17.1% return, despite an average holding period of 10.4 years. The recent-cycle top projects did materially better in roughly half the time: even the lowest-ranked project in that top 10, Park Colonial, averaged $394,949 profit and a 26.4% return over 5.9 years.
And that is still the softened version of the picture. Averages make the bottom end look more orderly than it really is. Once you zoom into individual projects, the numbers get ugly very quickly: the weak districts are not just producing lower gains, they contain projects where sellers waited years and still walked away with little profit, flat returns, or outright losses.
So...what gives?
The answer is not simply “buy the cheapest PSF”.
That would be too crude. In fact, some of the strongest recent-cycle winners were not bought below their nearby resale market. Buyers paid a premium. The important question is whether that premium made sense, and whether future resale buyers were willing to defend it.
This is where good entry matters.
| Metric | Parc Esta | Nearby 2km Comps | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entry PSF | $1,718 | $1,420 | +$297 |
| Exit PSF | $2,284 | $1,780 | +$503 |
| Premium Change | +$206 | ||
| Avg Return | 33.6% | 27.1% | +6.5 pts |
Parc Esta buyers were not buying the cheapest thing around Eunos/Geylang. They entered at about $297 psf above the nearby resale market.
But when those units later resold, the gap had widened to about $503 psf.
That is what the “premium change” row is showing.
At entry, Parc Esta was about $297 psf more expensive than the nearby comparison set. By resale, it was about $503 psf more expensive than that same comparison set.
So the premium did not shrink. It expanded by about $206 psf.
In simple terms: buyers did not just make money because the whole area rose. Parc Esta also moved further ahead of the nearby resale market. That does not tell us exactly why buyers were willing to pay more for it, but it does show that the resale market did not reject the launch premium.
It's the same thing at Jadescape.
| Metric | Jadescape | Nearby 2km Comps | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entry PSF | $1,732 | $1,419 | +$313 |
| Exit PSF | $2,267 | $1,810 | +$457 |
| Premium Change | +$144 | ||
| Avg Return | 31.4% | 29.1% | +2.3 pts |
Its entry price was also above nearby resale stock: about $313 psf higher than the 2km comparable set. But by exit, that premium had expanded to around $457 psf.
Again, the market did not punish the premium. It accepted it.
That is what separates a strong entry from an expensive one. A weak entry is not just paying a high PSF. A weak entry is paying a premium that future buyers refuse to recognise. A strong entry is paying a premium that the resale market can still defend later.
Across the wider recent-cycle sample, the same pattern shows up more clearly:
| Cohort | Avg Return | Premium At Entry | Premium At Resale | What Happened? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Top 10 Recent Winners | 29.4% | +$212 psf | +$307 psf | Expanded by $95 psf |
| Middle 10 | 12.9% | +$407 psf | +$310 psf | Compressed by $97 psf |
| Bottom 10 | 5.8% | +$565 psf | +$362 psf | Compressed by $202 psf |
The bottom 10 still resold above their nearby comparison set, but the gap narrowed.
They entered at an average premium of about $565 psf, and exited at about $362 psf. That means the premium compressed by roughly $202 psf. In plain English: later buyers still paid more for these projects than nearby alternatives, but not as much more as the original buyers had paid.
But there is another finding hiding inside the same numbers.
The nearby resale market was not exactly left behind.
Parc Esta did better than its nearby resale comparison set: 33.6% versus 27.1%. Jadescape also came out ahead: 31.4% versus 29.1%. But the gap was not so wide that resale looked like a poor alternative. In both cases, nearby resale still produced strong returns.
And in some parts of the recent-cycle sample, resale kept up even more closely. Around Whistler Grand, the project averaged a 29.5% return, while the nearby resale comparison set averaged 29.3%. Around Twin Vew, the nearby resale set actually edged ahead: 29.6% versus Twin Vew’s 28.9%.
That does not mean resale is automatically better. It means the lazy version of the new-launch story is incomplete.
The evidence does not say: buy new launch and avoid resale.
It says: good entry matters. Sometimes that good entry was a new launch. Sometimes it may have been a resale unit bought well, especially if the buyer had room to negotiate, avoid compromised layouts, and enter below what the surrounding market would later accept.
So the real question is not just “which districts performed best?”
The better question is: when a district starts moving, who captures more of the upside — the new-launch buyer, or the resale buyer who entered well?
That is the next piece worth digging into.